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| =='''Special Operations Section'''==
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| There are nights when the wolves are silent and only the moon howls.-George Carlin
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| {{Shootist}}
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| [[Image:SOTD_Sign.jpg]]
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| [[Image:Complant.gif]]
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| [[Image:Signal.jpg]]
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| {{wulves|The Special Operations Section}}
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| [[Image:Highlander.jpg]]
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| These, in the day when heaven was falling,
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| The hour when earth's foundations fled,
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| Followed their mercenary calling,
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| And took their wages, and are dead.
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| Their shoulders held the sky suspended;
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| They stood, and earth's foundations stay;
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| What God abandoned, these defended,
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| And saved the sum of things for pay.
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| -- -A.E. Housman "Epitaph On An Army of Mercenaries" --
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| [[Image:Red_beret-skull.gif]]
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| '''''Veritatem Cognocere!!!'''''
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| Introduction to Wulves 2nd CO and the Spec Op Section.
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| The Following is our standard opening to Allies and Contacts from forums:
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| Since this is the start of a strategy thread between the the Wulves and our excellent hosts-it would probably be appropriate to give a brief explanation of the Wulves concept and the actual Tactical Operations Procedure we have developed.
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| Who we are:The Wulves are a Paramilitary Guerilla group of survivors who use the apex preditor of North America and Europe as a paradigm for survival in Malton.
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| Paramilitary means loose ranks and command structure that sets objectives and lets the individuals decide how to accomplish them and is modeled from CIA Special Operations Teams.
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| Guerilla-from the french phrase for "little war", means use of manuver, communications and indirect approach to achieve strategic objectives rather than local ones.
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| (An example would be our continuing interest in Fort Perryn: The Fort can be retaken by the PKers and zeds as many times as they like because it STRATEGICALLY is a victory for us because it ties down the second largest zed group in the game and allows Whitenside to come alive. This is why you will often see us updating reports on Perryn and spending all our AP on FAKs inside the fort while other Wulves cade up the suburb behind the ferals)
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| These are our goals:
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| 1)Protect new survivors
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| 2)Fight off and cure the zombie horde
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| 3)Develope the barricades + buildings of: (Wyke Hills currently)
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| 4)Support and strengthen allies
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| 5)Develop intelligence and communication systems
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| These are our rules:
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| Wulves Laws
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| "Be extremely subtle, even to the point of formlessness. Be extremely mysterious, even to the point of soundlessness. Thereby you can be the director of the opponent's fate."-Sun Tzu
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| 1.STAY IN COMMUNICATION. As a strategic force, we cannot be effective if our members are unable to coordinate and plan an evacuation, counterstrike, or any other operation deemed necessary.
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| 2.DO NOT PK. PKing is strictly forbidden because it WASTES AP. The exception would be Black Ops Strike Teams. If any Wulves member violate this law they will immediately be suspended from the group. Do not waste AP on pointless vendettas. The way to respond to PKers is to hunt them as a team to encourage them to hunt elsewhere.
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| 3.BE STEALTHY. Respect the Zeds! Do not attract unwanted attention of zombies. If engaging OUTSIDE a building (to gain experiance points, for example), you must "Commit to the Hit" DO NOT LEAVE WOUNDED ZEDS! Don't start what you can't finish. Save your attack AP for Zeds inside buildings.
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| 4.HELP NEW PLAYERS. By enforcing the local barricade policy, reviving them when undead, directing them to the nearest VSB safehouse, etc. Aside from promoting the survivor cause and being the right thing to do, new players grow to be veterans and they will remember your help, thereby building a good group reputation and possibly some recruits.
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| 5.RESPECT + REVIVE ZOMBIES. Help Zeds at RPs. If they have infection, then try to heal them when they stand, also. If you see a survivor with infection that you did not revive and have a spare FAK, then you should still cure the infection and restore more health if possible. If we have enough wulves nearby, we may patrol a specific RP or set up a mobile revive site.
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| 6.FOLLOW GENERAL ORDERS. We cannot function as a guerilla unit while inert; our strength relies on our MOBILITY and ANOMINITY. If we move on an operation, we expect our team members to move with us. We disperse to move, concentrate to strike then disperse again. HIT AND RUN.
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| 7.WORK AS A TEAM We are a paramilitary guerilla group. This concept cannot be stressed enough: We value individual initiative in pursuit of common goals. Paramilitary means freedom of action in achieving operation objectives but mutual support in the face of adversity.
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| Here is how we do it:
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| What we do:
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| A) Intelligence or "Unseen Seeing" Operations:
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| Scouting Tasks-Entering buildings checking "I.D.s, Cades and corpses"
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| Surviellence Tasks-Monitoring Zed movements within a target range
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| Communications Tasks-Talk, radio, cell phone, satellite phone and spraypaint.
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| B) Miscellaneous or "Swiss Army Knife" Operations
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| Rescue Tasks- Patrols for Fak, interception and "shielding"
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| Recovery Tasks-Cade and building restoration
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| Coordination Tasks-The focusing of assets on "problems"
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| C) Special or "Black Ops" Operations
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| Psy-Ops-Involving tactics that mislead or discourage opponents without "contact"
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| Contract-Ops-Involving negotiations and information sharing with outside groups
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| Tactical Strikes- Hunter-Killer teams for targeted strikes
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| 2nd Company and the Spec Op Sect are part of the larger and more secretive Wulves organization which is headed up by the "Triumvirate" of which Highlanderjack and scouteric are members and contacts. Wulves operatives are sometimes not tagged in as such for covert reasons and to avoid giving away information to opponents and rival organizations.
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| That about sums up our ideas in a nutshell. We look forward to working together with allied groups and individuals.
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| Elements of Thompson's moderate approach are adapted here:[24]
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| 1. '''The people are the key base to be secured and defended rather than territory won or enemy bodies counted.''' Contrary to the focus of conventional warfare, territory gained, or casualty counts are not of overriding importance in counter-guerrilla warfare. The support of the population is the key variable. Since many insurgents rely on the population for recruits, food, shelter, financing, and other materials, the counter-insurgent force must focus its efforts on providing physical and economic security for that population and defending it against insurgent attacks and propaganda.
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| 2. '''There must be a clear political counter-vision that can overshadow, match or neutralize the guerrilla vision.''' This can range from granting political autonomy, to economic development measures in the affected region. The vision must be an integrated approach, involving political, social and economic and media influence measures. A nationalist narrative for example, might be used in one situation, an ethnic autonomy approach in another. An aggressive media campaign must also be mounted in support of the competing vision or the counter-insurgent regime will appear weak or incompetent.
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| 3.''' Practical action must be taken at the lower levels to match the competitive political vision.''' It may be tempting for the counter-insurgent side to simply declare guerrillas "terrorists" and pursue a harsh liquidation strategy. Brute force however, may not be successful in the long run. Action does not mean capitulation, but sincere steps such as removing corrupt or arbitrary officials, cleaning up fraud, building more infrastructure, collecting taxes honestly, or addressing other legitimate grievances can do much to undermine the guerrillas' appeal.
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| 4.''' Economy of force.''' The counter-insurgent regime must not overreact to guerrilla provocations, since this may indeed be what they seek to create a crisis in civilian morale. Indiscriminate use of firepower may only serve to alienate the key focus of counterinsurgency- the base of the people. Police level actions should guide the effort and take place in a clear framework of legality, even if under a State of Emergency. Civil liberties and other customs of peacetime may have to be suspended, but again, the counter-insurgent regime must exercise restraint, and cleave to orderly procedures. In the counter-insurgency context, "boots on the ground" are even more important than technological prowess and massive firepower, although anti-guerrilla forces should take full advantage of modern air, artillery and electronic warfare assets.
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| 5. '''Big unit action may sometimes be necessary.''' If police action is not sufficient to stop the guerrilla fighters, military sweeps may be necessary. Such "big battalion" operations may be needed to break up significant guerrilla concentrations and split them into small groups where combined civic-police action can control them.
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| 6.''' Aggressive mobility.''' Mobility and aggressive small unit action is extremely important for the counter-insurgent regime. Heavy formations must be lightened to aggressively locate, pursue and fix insurgent units. Huddling in static strongpoints simply concedes the field to the insurgents. They must be kept on the run constantly with aggressive patrols, raids, ambushes, sweeps, cordons, roadblocks, prisoner snatches, etc.
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| 7. '''Ground level embedding and integration.''' In tandem with mobility is the embedding of hardcore counter-insurgent units or troops with local security forces and civilian elements. The US Marines in Vietnam also saw some success with this method, under its CAP (Combined Action Program) where Marines were teamed as both trainers and "stiffeners" of local elements on the ground. US Special Forces in Vietnam like the Green Berets, also caused significant local problems for their opponents by their leadership and integration with mobile tribal and irregular forces.[26] The CIA's Special Activities Division created successful guerrilla forces from the Hmong tribe during the war in Vietnam in the 1960s,[27] from the Northern Alliance against the Taliban during the war in Afghanistan in 2001,[28] and from the Kurdish Peshmerga against Ansar al-Islam and the forces of Saddam Hussein during the war in Iraq in 2003.[29][30] In Iraq, the 2007 US "surge" strategy saw the embedding of regular and special forces troops among Iraqi army units. These hardcore groups were also incorporated into local neighborhood outposts in a bid to facilitate intelligence gathering, and to strengthen ground level support among the masses.[25]
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| 8. '''Cultural sensitivity.''' Counter-insurgent forces require familiarity with the local culture, mores and language or they will experience numerous difficulties. Americans experienced this in Vietnam and during the US Iraqi Freedom invasion and occupation, where shortages of Arabic speaking interpreters and translators hindered both civil and military operations.
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| 9. '''Systematic intelligence effort.''' Every effort must be made to gather and organize useful intelligence. A systematic process must be set up to do so, from casual questioning of civilians to structured interrogations of prisoners. Creative measures must also be used, including the use of double agents, or even bogus "liberation" or sympathizer groups that help reveal insurgent personnel or operations.
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| 10.''' Methodical clear and hold.''' An "ink spot" clear and hold strategy must be used by the counter-insurgent regime, dividing the conflict area into sectors, and assigning priorities between them. Control must expand outward like an ink spot on paper, systematically neutralizing and eliminating the insurgents in one sector of the grid, before proceeding to the next. It may be necessary to pursue holding or defensive actions elsewhere, while priority areas are cleared and held.
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| 11. '''Careful deployment of mass popular forces and special units.''' Mass forces include village self-defence groups and citizen militias organized for community defence and can be useful in providing civic mobilization and local security. Specialist units can be used profitably, including commando squads, long range reconnaissance and "hunter-killer" patrols, defectors who can track or persuade their former colleagues like the Kit Carson units in Vietnam, and paramilitary style groups. Strict control must be kept over specialist units to prevent the emergence of violent vigilante style reprisal squads that undermine the government's program.
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| 12. '''The limits of foreign assistance must be clearly defined and carefully used.''' Such aid should be limited either by time, or as to material and technical, and personnel support, or both. While outside aid or even troops can be helpful, lack of clear limits, in terms of either a realistic plan for victory or exit strategy, may find the foreign helper "taking over" the local war, and being sucked into a lengthy commitment, thus providing the guerrillas with valuable propaganda opportunities as the stream of dead foreigners mounts. Such a scenario occurred with the US in Vietnam, with the American effort creating dependence in South Vietnam, and war weariness and protests back home. Heavy-handed foreign interference may also fail to operate effectively within the local cultural context, setting up conditions for failure.
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| 13. '''Time.''' A key factor in guerrilla strategy is a drawn-out, protracted conflict that wears down the will of the opposing counter-insurgent forces. Democracies are especially vulnerable to the factor of time. The counter-insurgent force must allow enough time to get the job done. Impatient demands for victory centered around short-term electoral cycles play into the hands of the guerrillas, though it is equally important to recognize when a cause is lost and the guerrillas have won.
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| Amon Amarth-Guardians of Asgaard
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| standing firm against all odds
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| guarding the most sacred home
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| we protect the realm of gods
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| our destiny is carved in stone
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| three evil giants
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| of the south
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| are constantly on the attack
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| with lies of fire
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| from their mouths
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| but we always send them back
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| we are brothers
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| of the north
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| who are sharing the all father's blood
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| marching down the left hand path
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| we are spawned by Asagods
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| 'cause we are
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| we're the guardians
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| guardians of asgaard
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| guardians
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| guardians of asgaard
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| guardians
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| of asgaard
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| we have faced our
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| enemies
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| a thousand times or even more
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| still they cannot
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| make us kneel
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| one thousand years of constant war
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| the giants look for
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| any chance
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| to bring down asgaard's mighty walls
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| no matter what they send at us
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| we will never let it fall
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| 'cause we are
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| we're the guardians
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| guardians of asgaard
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| guardians
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| guardians of asgaard
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| guardians
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| of asgaard
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|
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| standing firm
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| against all odds
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| we are guardians
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| asgaard's migthy walls
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| we protect
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| the realm of asagods
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| no matter
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| what they send at us
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| we will never
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| let them fall
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| [[Category:Group Subpages]]
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