User:Vanitas Mori/Sandbox

RSoM

The Royal Society Of Malton Abbreviation: RSoM Leadership: The Philosophe Knights Goals: Maintain a scholarly society Location: Southall Mansion Recruitment Policy: Any scholar may join. Contact: RSoM Talk Page What is the Royal Society? The Royal Society of Malton is an organization consisting of both groups and individuals that wish to follow an intellectual pursuit in addition to their various daily activities. Though the Philosophe Knights began and run the Royal Society, the organization is not affiliated to any other cause than that of education. Joining the Royal Society Becoming a member of the Royal Society is a rather straightforward process, simply add either of the following templates to your page (click on the letters between the brackets to see the template): {{RSoM}} {{SmallRSoM}} Philosophy Centers Of Learning Policy Supporter This user or group supports the Centers of Learning Policy & acknowledges that all libraries, schools, zoos, and museums in the city of Malton are considered safe places. No survivor in one of these locations may be killed for any reason unless that survivor is a specified enemy of this user or group. Artifact Protection Policy Supporter This user or group supports the Artifact Protection Policy, acknowledging that the looting of museums is strictly prohibited. This user or group will do what they can to prevent museum theft in order to preserve Malton's cultural and intellectual integrity. Fine Art of Malton Supporter This user or group supports the Fine Art of Malton movement & acknowledges that all museums are PK ceasefire zones, heal points, and are to be a barricading priority. Suggested Reading "Zombies" First published Mon Sep 8, 2003; substantive revision Mon Oct 9, 2006 Entire Article The following is an excerpt from the aforementioned article. Zombies are exactly like us in all physical respects but have no conscious experiences: by definition there is ‘nothing it is like’ to be a zombie. Yet zombies behave like us, and some even spend a lot of time discussing consciousness. This disconcerting fantasy helps to make the problem of phenomenal consciousness vivid, especially as a problem for physicalism. Few people think zombies actually exist. But many hold they are at least conceivable, and some that they are ‘logically’ or ‘metaphysically’ possible. It is argued that if zombies are so much as a bare possibility, then physicalism is false and some kind of dualism must be accepted. For many philosophers that is the chief importance of the zombie idea. But the idea is also of interest for its presuppositions about the nature of consciousness and how the physical and the phenomenal are related. Use of the zombie idea against physicalism also raises more general questions about relations between imaginability, conceivability, and possibility. Finally, zombies raise epistemological difficulties: they reinstate the ‘other minds’ problem.